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ABSTRAcr 
The  effect of risk aversion on  Nash  equilibrium trade restrictions is studied 
using numerical methods.  An  increase in a nation's level of risk aversion can 
lead to either an  increase or decrease in its equilibrium restriction and 
either an  increase or decrease  in its rival's restriction.  The  linear qua-
dratic dYnamic  game  is generalized to include risk aversion. 
; RISK  AVERSION.IN  A DYNAMIC  TR~ING GAME 
"Across  the Pacific,  the Japanese are officially very worried 
about  the rumpus  in America  over trade.  Privately,  however, 
they think it is a  cheap negotiating ploy •••• the Americans 
are always  saying  they have  no  more  time;  yet the earth still 
turns." 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  belief is prevalent  (among  the public and  policymakers)  that, by  adopting 
an  aggressive posture,  a  nation can  obtain concessions from  trading partners. 
Recent  U.  S.  attempts to use agricultural export subsidies to influence the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy of the European  Community  (EC)  is an  example  of 
such  a  strategy.  The  generality of the circumstances  in which  aggression  in-
duces  a  conciliatory response has  probably been  exaggerated.  This  issue is 
investigated by  using a  numerical  solution to a  dyna~ic stochastic noncoopera-
tive Nash  game  and  examining  the sensitivity of the long-run  equilibrium to 
changes  in players'  levels of risk aversion.  Attention is focused  on  the 
parameters of risk aversion for  two  reasons.  J 
The  first reason  is that aggressive positions tend, at least in the popu-
lar imagination,  to be  associated with greater risk.  This may  occur because 
aggression  invites retaliation and  often  involves threats which  are painful to 
carry out and  costly to repudiate.  More  simply,  an  aggressive trade policy 
may  leave a  nation more  exposed  to exogenous  uncertainty.  In  the examples 
considered below,  where  large trading nations use tariffs and  export taxes, 
one  nation'S welfare is inversely related to the level of its rival's policy; 
therefore,  the level of that policy provides an  index of the level of aggres-
sion.  The  analysis suggests that a  nation's level of risk aversion may  be 
either positively or negatively related to the level of its equilibrium policy 
and,  hence,  its level of aggression. 
The  second  reason  for concentrating on  the effect of a  nation'S level of 
risk aversion is that this defuses the question of the credibility of poli-
cies.  These  policies are determined endogenously given levels of risk -2-
aversion.  The  latter can be  re~arded as structural parameters.  The  level of 
risk aversion is one  aspect of a  nation's reputation.  The  analysis gives an 
indication of the value of that characteristic.  The  issue of how  a nation 
communicates  its degree of risk aversion,  which  is analogous  to the question 
of how  a nation develops  a  reputation,  is not considered.  Here  there is no 
uncertainty about  the motives  of one's rival as  in the papers by  Kreps  and 
Wilson  (1982)  and  Sobel  (1985);  the uncertainty is with respect to the evolu-
tion of the environment. 
Even  in ,situations where  lower  risk aversion leads  to more  bellicose be-
havior,  the relation between  one  nation's risk aversion and  its rival's equi-
librium policy is unclear.  This  is the more  int~resting question because of 
the popular belief that a reputation for toughness may  persuade rivals to be 
cooperative.  The  conclusion is that, even  where  a  decrease  in risk aversion 
corresponds to a reputation for toughness  (a more  aggressive policy), riv.als 
may  choose not to moderate  their own  policies.  This  is not a  particularly 
surprising result (reaction functions need not be monotonic),  but it appears 
to be  frequently overlooked by  negotiators. 
The  game  analyzed here involves the determination of Nash  equilibrium 
tariffs/export taxes by  a  group  of large nations.  Johnson's  (1954)  paper is  , 
the classic article on  this subject.  Recent  additions to the literature in-
clude the papers by  Hamilton  and  Whalley  (1983),  Thursby  and  Jensen  (1983), 
and  Karp  and  McCalla  (1983).  Hamilton and Whalley extend Johnson's paper by 
considering equilibrium policies under more  general demand  and  supply condi-
tions.  Thursby and  Jensen examine  the sensitivity of the equilibrium to 
players'  conjectural variations;  previous studies assumed  a  zero conjectural 
variation.  Karp  and  McCalla  use Kydland's  (1976)  dynamic  programming  solution -3-
to the linear-quadratic  (LQ)  discrete time dynamic  game;  they obtain equilib-
rium  tariffs/taxes for a partial equilibrium model  where  supply is determined 
by  lagged price and  the government's  objectives are the discounted streams of 
future social surplus. 
This paper uses  the linear-exponential-Gaussian  (LEG)  dynamic  game  for  the 
numerical  examples.  This has  the same  form  as the LQ  game  except that the 
quadratic objective function is exponentiated so players can  be  regarded as 
maximizing  the expected value of the utility of a  payoff which  is quadratic in 
the state and  controls.  The  utility function has  constant absolute risk aver-
sion (CARA).  The  random  term is additive and  Gaussian.  This is a  generaliza-
tion of the LEG  control problem  solved by  Jacobson  (1973).  If all players are 
risk neutral or the variance of the random  term goes  to 0,  the game  collapses 
to the LQ  game  solved by  Kydland  (1975)  and  Pindyck  (1977).  Since tractable 
dynamic  stochastic games  are something of a  rarity,  the solution of this game 
holds  some  intrinsic interest  (see Castanon and  Athans  (1976)  and  C1ernhout  and 
Wan  (1985)  for other tractable games;  C1ernhout  and  Wan  (1979)  and  Jorgensen 
(1982)  survey applications of dynamic  games). 
The  reason for the choice of a  game  that accommodates  stochastics is ap-
parent from  the previous discussion.  TheFe  are two  reasons  for  including 
dynamics.  The  obvious  one  is that, in many  markets,  dynamics  playa critical 
role; this is especially true,  for example,  in agricultural markets where 
supply decisions are made  before price is known.  Therefore,  a  dynamic  model 
provides a  more  accurate description of reality than does  a  static model. 
A second  and  for the present purposes  a more  compelling reason for  includ-
ing dynamics  is to circumvent  the problem  associated with conjectural varia-
tions.  The  equilibrium to a static game  presumably  represents a  long-run 
• -4-
equilibrium.  The  cornmon  assump~ion of zero conjectural variations provides an 
implausible adjustment mechanism  and,  also,  an  implausible equilibrium; -agents 
never learn from  past mistakes.  The  notion of consistent conjectural varia-
tions  (Bresnahan  (1981)  and  Perry (1982))  used  to select a particular conjec-
tura1 variation and,  hence,  a particular equilibrium has not been entirely 
successful.  The  reason is that the  imposition of "consistency" narrows 'the 
field but does not lead to a  unique conjectural variation unless an additional 
restriction,  such as linearity,  is imposed  (Kamien  and  Schwartz  (1983);  see, 
also, Laitner  (1980)  on  the-question of rational conjectures).  Conjectural 
variations are used  to tell a  dynamic  story with a  static model  but have  no 
role in a  dynamic  model.  At  each stage in the dYnamic  game,  a  zero conjec-
tural variation for  that stage is most  reasonable since rivals can only react 
to departures from  the equilibrium in subsequent stages.  In a  dynamic  game, 
the notion of subgame  perfectness (Selten,  1975)  seems  the appropriate way  to 
determine  the equilibrium.  The  dynamic  programming solution to the game  re-
suIts in subgame  perfectness. 
The  next section presents the LEG  game  and  the solution.  The  following 
section describes numerical  examples  which  illustrate the remarks made  above 
concerning the effect of a  player's level of risk aversion.  A conclusion 
follows. 
2 •  1HE  PROBLEM  AND  SOLlITION 
Player irs objective is to maximize 
;  (1) -5-
for  i  = 1,  2,  •.. ,  P where  p  is the number  of players,  0i = ±l,  and  Et  is 
- the expectation at time t.  The  state equation is: 
P 
Xs  = A  x  1  +  LB. u  .  +  r  e  s  s- i=l  S,l  S,l  s  S 
(2) 
where  u  .  is the lth player's control vector  in period s,  ES  ~ N(O,  L S)' and  S,l 
the vector x has been augmented  to include the stacked vector of controls 
,  ,  , 
(u  l' u  2  •  s,  s,  •• us,p)'  = Us  and  the element 1.  Thus,  the quadratic form 
of x  includes  linear terms and  interaction among  the various players'  controls. 
The  matrices,  Qs,i' As'  Bs,i' and  rs'  are of appropriate dimension;  LS  is 
nonsingular,  with  inverse Ps.  (Equation  (2) may.pe  the first-order representa-
tion of a  higher order difference equation.) 
A set of Nash  controls at time t, given state xt _l '  consists of a  set of 
*  control rules, Gs,i(xs_l ),  for  s  = t, t  +  1,  ••• ,  nand i  = 1,  2,  ••• ,  P  such 
that no  player can  unilaterally deviate from  his  c~~trol rule without decreasing 
his expected utility.  As  in the LQ  dynamic  game  and  the LQ  and  LEG  control prob-
*  lems,  G  .  is linear in x  1.  It will be  apparent  from  the solution that giving  s ,1  s-
the players access to the history of the state prior to xs-l  does  not alter the 
control rules.  This is not true when  the state is imperfectly observed  (Speyer 
et al.  (1974)). 
The  following definitions are used: 
- -
B  = [B  11 B  2 I ••• I  B  P  1;  (B*  W)s  =  .5  5,  5,  S,  [Ws,l  B s,1IWs,2  B s,21  ••• IWs,p Bs,pl' 
"  , 
where  Wi  is defined below;  G s  = [Gs,1IGs,21 ••• IGs,pl';  and  Us  was  .-
defined above  as the stacked vector of controls. -6-
The  Nash  controls are: 
(3) 
where 
G  = -[(B*  W)  B ]-1  (B*  W)  A  s  5  5  5  5 
(4  ) 
where  Ws  i  is obtained by  solving  , 
(5) 
and  Wi  is given by 
I 
,  - ,  - .: , -1  ,-
W 1  .  - Q  +  A  {W  - (B*  W)s  [(B*  W)s  B]  B  W  .  5- ,1  - 5-1 , iss  5  5  5,  1 
- W  .  Bs[(B*  W)s  B ]-1  (B*  W) 
5,1  s.  5 
(6a) 
Wn,i  = On,io  (6b) 




The  derivation of the above  equations  follows  Jacobson's solution to the 
LEG  control problem.  Rather than go  through the algebra,  a brief discussion 
of the method  is given.  At  period n,  the dynamic  game  is a  single-period 
game.  Integrate player i's objective function over the normal  density and 
complete  the square to remove  the expectation operator.  The  result is a 
nonstochastic game  which  is easily solved for the set of control rules,  G n. 
The  control vector,  un'  is replaced by  G n xn-l;  and  the process  is re-
peated at stage n  - 1. 
, 
The  second-order conditions are that B  .  W  .  B  .  be negative definite 
S,1  S,l  S,l  , 
for all s,i and  that  (B*  W)s  B be  nonsingular  (cf. 4).  These  are analogous  to 
the second-order conditions given by  Kydland  (19~S), and  the interpretation is 
, 
the same.  An  additional necessary condition is that  II  - OLS  rs Wi  s  rsl  >  0  , 
to ensure that the solution is bounded.  These  conditions are evident from  the 
derivation. 
Giving  the players at t  access  to the historY"Qf the state prior to t  - 1 
does  not change  the equilibrium rules.  This can be  s~en from  (4).  Suppose 
that the n+lth element of x  is a  lagged value of another element  of x.  Then 
the n+lth column  of A is the null vector so that rules and,  consequently,  the 
expected payoff at each period is unchanged. 
A slight modification to the algorithm is required for problems  that in-
volve a  discount factor.  At  any  stage t, the present value of the future 
stream of benefits  (the quadratic form  in 1), is discounted to time t, not to 
time  O.  Failure to do  this  implies that the risk-aversion coefficient changes 
over time.  Define the discount rate as  6.  The  second  term on  the right 
side of  (6a)  is multiplied by  6,  and  the first term,  Q  1  ., is not  s- ,1 
discounted. -8-
The  LEG  differential game  c~n be  easily solved with methods  analogous  to 
those used by  Jacobson  for  the LEG  continuous  time  control problem.  This  pro-
vides a  generalization of Starr and  Ho's  (1969)  results.  This solution and 
the analysis of the symmetric  game  are provided  in Karp  (1985b). 
3.  TIlE  ROLE  OF  RISK  AVERSION  IN  A DYNAMIC  TRADING  GA\1E 
Numerical  examples  are used  to shed  some  light on  the effect of an  agent's 
risk aversion on  equilibrium policies.  The  basic model  is taken from  Karp 
and  McCalla ,who  describe tne data;  this model  provides a  simple representation 
of the world market  for coarse grains.  It is chosen not for the insight it 
offers into the coarse grains market,  which  is m~nimal, but because it incor-
porates parameter values lying within a plausible range  for many  traded com-
modities.  The  world  is divided into three regions:  the United States--a net 
exporter of coarse grains--and the EC  and  the Rest of World  (ROW)--both  net 
importers.  Average  quantities produced  and  consum~d and  average domestic 
prices from  the 1970s  and,  also, previously estimateq supply and  demand  elas-
ticities were  used  to synthesize domestic  linear supply and  demand  functions 
for the three regions.  Domestic  supply in period t  is a  function of domestic 
price in t  - 1.  Setting world  excess demand  to 0 results in a  first-order 
difference equation for world price.  A random  term,  €  ~N(O, .1), was  added 
to this equation.  Domestic  price in the EC  (United States) differs from  world 
price by  a  unit tariff (export tax).l  The  ROW  behaves  passIvely;  any  trade 
restrictions it imposes  are assumed  to be  already incorporated in its supply 
and  demand  functions. 
Average  quantities from  the 1970s  are given in Table I.  Although  the  EC 
accounts  for over  a  third of the world's net  imports,  it is small relative to Table  I 
Quantity used  to synthesize functions  for  small  EC  scenario 
Supply 
Demand 
Uni ted  European  Rest  of 
States  Conununities  world 
14.6 
11.0 









the United States.  The  domestic. supply and  demand  elasticities for  the United 
2  States and  the EC  are similar, but  the difference  in size implies  that-a 
U.  S.  export tax has  a significantly greater effect on  world price than does 
an  EC  tariff of the same  magnitude.  The  effect of the asymmetry  is investi-
gated by decreasing the size of ROWand  making  corresponding  increases in the 
size of the EC;  that is, the quantities used  to compute  ROW's  supply and  de-
mand  curves are reduced,  and  those that are used  to compute  the EC's  curves 
are increased so that average world  quantity (at the historical price) remains 
the same.  This changes all coefficients in the difference equation for world 
price and  not  just the  impact  of a  particular EC  policy.  It also alters the 
coefficients of the EC  objective ftmction.  '.J 
The  scenario in which  the domestic  supply and  demand  ftmctions  for  the EC 
and  ROW  were  calculated using the quantities in Table  I  is referred to as 
"small EC."  Two  other scenarios are discussed below:  "meditnn  EC"  and  "large 
EC."  In the former,  average  EC  demand  (supply)  is-increased by  5(4);  in the 
latter, average EC  demand  (supply)  is increased by  1&.1  (18.4).  Since  ROW 
quantities were  reduced by  corresponding amounts,  the large EC  scenario essen-
tially eliminates ROW.  Define  the equilibritnn impact multiplier of a  nation's 
trade restriction as the derivative of current price with respect to the na-
tion'S restriction,  given that the levels of current and  lagged restrictions 
are equal;  this multiplier is the sum  of the coefficients on  the current and 
lagged restriction in the price equation.  The  multipliers for the United 
States in the cases where  the EC  is small, meditnn,  and  large are  .82,  .79,  and 
.72,  respectively.  The  multipliers for  the EC  in the three cases are -.11, 
-.34, and  -.91, respectively.  These  provide one  index of the region's rela-
tive power. -11-
The  single-period payoff for the EC  and  the United States is the sum  of 
domestic  consumer  and  producer  surplus and  tariff/tax revenues.  The  total 
payoff for each country is the present value of the stream of its future 
single-period payoffs;  the discount rate was  set at  .909.  The  total payoff of 
region  i  was  scaled by  a  constant r i  and  exponentiated.  The  switch,  ai' 
was  set at  :1;  0i = 1(-1)  implies constant absolute risk preference 
(aversion) of ri .  The  horizon,  n, was  set at 25  periods. 
In all cases discussed,  the sufficient conditions for optimality and 
existence were  satisfied.  This restricts the range of risk parameters. 
Table  II  repor~s results for  the situation where  both  countries are risk 
averse.  The  sr.~ll  EC  scenario was  also analyzed .with risk-preferring coun-
tries.  Although  small  levels of risk preference did not alter the results in 
Table II, it ~~s possible to reverse many  of them  by  choosing sufficiently 
large levels of risk preference.  This situation is of little economic  inter-
est and  is not  considered further. 
Two  types of statistics were  calculated.  The  first-period control rules 
of the finite horizon game,  which  approximate  the stationary rules of the in-
finite horizon game,  were  used  to calculate the long-run expected equilibrium 
world price, U.  S.  tax,  and  EC  tariff.  1here are the stationary values of the 
undisturbed dynamic  system under  the Nash  equilibrium control rules.  The  dis-
cussion treats these long-run equilibrium values rather than the control rules 
directly because of the simpler interpretation of the former.  For  example,  if 
an  increase in country its risk aversion causes  a  decrease in long-run equi-
librium trade restriction of both countries,  then it is reasonable to claim 
that, as country i  behaves more  cautiously (less aggressively),  it~riva1 fol-
lows  suit. aLong-run  expected  values. 
bPresent  value  of a  IO-year  stream using  long-run  equilibrilllTl  values  as  initial conditions and  Nash ,con-
trol  rules. 
NOTE:  The  symbols  +,  -, and? indicate that the change  is positive,  negative,  or positive for  some  values 
and  negative  for others,  respectively.  The  risk-aversion parameters were  varied  between  .01  and  .2. 
The  symbol  -*  is negative except  when  the United  States is very  risk averse;  then  the  opposite holds. 
."., -13-
The  first-period control rules were  then used  to calculate the expected 
value and  variance of each country's payoff over  a  lO-year period using.the 
stationary price and  tariff/tax as an  initial condition.  This provides 
another  indication of how  a  change  in equilibrium,  caused by  a  change  in one 
government's  degree of caution, affects its own  and  its rival's welfare.  The 
expected value of the payoff was  calculated using a  recursive formula,  and  the 
variance was  obtained using numerical  approximations to the moment-generating 
function.  Karp  (198Sa)  discusses this method  and  compares  the approximation 
to exact calculation of the variance. 
hben  the EC  is small,  the following  results hold  (columns  1-3  and  rows  1 
and  2 of Table II): 
1.  An  increase  in risk aversion by  either country causes its own 
expected long-run equilibrium (hereafter,  "equilibrium") trade 
restriction to decrease. 
2.  An  increase in U.  S.  risk aversion causes  (a)  EC  equilibrium 
restriction to fall and  (b)  equilibrium price to rise. 
3.  An  increase in EC  risk aversion causes  (a) U.  S.  equilibrium 
restriction to rise and  (b)  equilibrium price to rise. 
Result 1 was  expected.  Previous  simula~ion studies  (Karp  (198Sa))  indi-
cate that, for the optimal tariff problem  (rather than the game),  an  increase 
in risk aversion leads to a  drop  in trade restrictions.  For  the control prob-
1em,  a more  risk-averse nation lowers  its trade restriction to lessen the in-
stability of world price.  Although  there is a  tendency  for this to also hold 
in a  game,  rows  4 and  6 indicate that it need not.  For  the large EC  scenario 
(and medium  EC  with the United States very risk averse),  an  increa.se  in EC  . 
risk aversion leads to an increase in the EC  equilibrium tariff.  This is an -14-
instance where  the intuition obtained from  an  optimization problem  does  not 
carryover to the games  analog.  A given change  in equilibrium may  be  associ-
ated with either an  increase or decrease in a  country's risk aversion,  depend-
ing  on  the other parameters of the  game  (compare  columns  1-3 of rows  2 and  6 
in Table  II).  Although  in some  respects the game  is a  very simple one,  the 
determination of the equilibrium is still a  black box. 
The  contrast between  2(a) and  3(a)  is somewhat  surprising.  As  the United 
~tates becomes  more  cautious and,  hence,  less aggressive,  the Ee  follows 
suit.  The  United States, however,  takes advantage of a more  cautious Ee  by 
increasing its trade restriction.  A possible explanation,  suggested above,  is 
the relative dominance  of the United States  caus~d by  its greater size (its 
larger impact multiplier).  The  results of the medium  Ee  and  large Ee  sce-
narios support this hypothesis.  In those scenarios, both nations become  more 
accommodating  as their rival becomes  more  risk averse.  This  has  to be  inter-
preted cautiously since greater risk aversion by  ~Qe Ee  does  not necessarily 
imply  a  lower  level of trade restriction as noted aboye.  There  is a  tendency 
for the two  countries to lower  their restriction in response to their rival's 
trade liberalization, but this is no  more  than a  tendency. 
Equilibrium price may  either rise or fall as a  result of a nation becoming 
more  risk averse.  When  the Ee  is small,  price must  rise as it becomes  more 
risk averse since its tariff decreases and  U.  S.  tax increases;  the opposite 
holds when  the Ee  is large.  In other cases,  the change  in price depends  on 
the-relative magnitude  of the changes  in trade restrictions.  World  price is 
not a  sufficient statistic for  a  nation's welfare,  but it is very meaningful 
to policymakers.  Therefore,  it is of interest to point out that, by  appearing 
to be  more  cautious and  reducing  trade barriers, an  exporting nation may -15-
induce its rival to make  more  than offsetting reductions,  leading to an  in-
crease  in the price of exports. 
The  second set of statistics consists of the expected value and  variance 
of the present value of a  10-year stream of social surplus.  As  the risk-
aversion parameter  squared  goes  to 0,  the CARA  utility function  is asymptotic 
to the mean-variance criterion.  Therefore,  for small  levels of risk aversion, 
a  positive relation between  a  nation's mean  and  variance  is expected  (as its 
own  level of risk aversion is altered).  This need not hold  for  large levels 
of risk aversion where  higher  than second  moments  become  important. 
The  results for  the small  and  medium  EC  are very intuitive.  As  a  nation 
becomes  more  risk averse,  it acts to stabilize  p~ice and  its welfare and  de-
creases the expected value of welfare.  Its rival benefits from  the increased 
stability which  decreases the variance and  increases the expected value of its 
welfare.  Using  mean  and  variance of welfare as  indices,  the conclusion from 
the small  and  medium  EC  scenarios is that a  nation.prefers to face a  cautious 
rival.  As  the previous discussion pointed out,  this conclusion does  not hold 
if world  price is used as an  index. 
The  large EC  scenario shows  that the above  intuitive results can  be  re-
versed.  For  example,  an  increase in U.  S.  (EC)  risk aversion leads to an  . 
increase in U.  S.  (EC)  expected welfare and  a  decrease in the variance of its 
own  welfare.  An  increase in one  country's risk aversion may  lead to a  de-
crease in its opponent's expected welfare or an  increase in its opponent's 
variance of welfare.  Thus,  using mean  and  variance as indices,  there are 
situations where  a  country may  not prefer to face a  cautious rival;  similarly, 
there are situations where  a  country may  prefer to convince  its rival that it 
is very risk averse. -16-
Table III suggests the magnitude of the changes.  The  first column  gives 
the statistics of the free-trade equilibrium for  the three scenarios,  and  the 
second  two  columns  give the statistics of the Nash  game  when  both countries 
have  the same  level of risk aversion.  Using world price as an  index  of 
welfare,  the U.  S.  gains and  the EC  loses when  the region switches  from  free 
trade to a  Nash  equilibrium.  The  same  is true for the small  and  medium  EC 
scenarios when  the mean  and  variance of the payoff are used as  indices.  The 
United States achieves substantial reductions  in the variance of its payoff 
under  both  ~ash regimes.  When  the EC  is large,  the expected U.  S.  payoff 
decreases as does  the variance of the EC  payoff under  the Nash  regimes.  The 
historical price (lagged price) used  to synthesr,e the domestic  supply and 
demand  functions was  1.126  (1.1);  therefore,  in the large EC  scenario,  the  ROW 
becomes  a net exporter. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The  effect of risk aversion on  equilibrium trade  poli~ies was  studied using 
numerical  examples  and  a  LEG  noncooperative Nash  dynamic  game.  The  level of 
risk aversion was  chqsen because it is an  important characteristic of a  na-
tion's reputation.  Two  questions were  posed:  Does  greater risk aversion 
cause a  nation to choose a  less-aggressive policy?  At  a  noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium,  is a  decrease  in the level of one  nation's trade restriction met 
by  an  increase or decrease in a rival's policy?  The  questions were  addressed 
within the confines of a  very restrictive model,  the chief features of which 
are an  LQ  structure with additive Gaussian noise and  a  CARA  utility function. 
Even  with such a  restrictive model,  the answer  to both questions  i~ ambiguous; 
different conclusions are obtained from  a  range of reasonable parameter values. Small  EC 
Price 
lJ.  S.  tax 
Expected  U.  S.  payoffb 
Variance of U.  S.  payoff 
EC  tariff 
Expected  EC  payoffb 
Variance of EC  payoff 
Medium  EC 
Price 
U.  S.  tax 
Expected  U.  S.  payoffb 
Variance of U.  S.  payoff 
EC  tariff 
Expected  EC  payoffb 
Variance of EC  payoff 
Large  EC 
Price 
U.  S.  tax 
Expected  U.  S.  payoffb 
Variance of U.  S.  payoff 
EC  tariff 
Expe~~ed EC  payoffb 
Variance of EC  payoff 
Table  III 
Statistics for different scenariosa 
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aThe  three scenarios are small,  medium,  and  large ECs.  For  each  scenario,  the case of free  trade and  the 
case where  both countries have  same  levels of risk aversion  (.05 or  .1S)  and  play the Nash  game  are 
considered. 
hExpected  payoff  is negative because constant  is deleted  from  social surplus function. 






This  is important because  p~licymakers are likely to select negotiating 
positions under  the  impressions  that a  more  aggressive posture is riskier and 
that,  when  credible,  a  more  aggressive policy leads to concessions on  the part 
of rivals.  As  is usually the case,  one  must  be  circumspect  in extracting 
general policy recommendations  from  the model.  The  determination of actual 
trade policies is a  far more  subtle and  complex  process and  has more  in common 
with  a  bargaining problem  than  a  noncooperative game. 
The  problems  of making  an  aggressive posture  (or threat point) credible 
and  the dangers  of politically (or psychologically) motivated retaliation are 
well  recognized.  The  fact that an  aggressive stance may  not be  desirable even 
when  these problems  and  dangers are assumed  away'.provides  an  argument  in favor 
of adOPting  a  conciliatory posture  in negotiations. 
; -19-
NOTES 
1.  The  players are referred to as  the "U.  S." and  the "EC"  throughout. 
Given  the inadequacy of the empirical base,  these designations are intended 
only to suggest a  large exporter and  importer of agricultural products.  In 
practice,  the United States obviously does  not attempt to use an  optimal 
expor"t  tax,  although certain policies (e.g.,  the loan rate) may  inhibit U.  S. 
exports. 
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